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Abstract 
 
A meta-theory was developed that brought together implicit premises or world views that constantly re-surface in human 
thought. Although these elements, which are often referred to in the literature as the result of differences in human 
‘temperament’, have long been part of the scholarly activity of humankind, a comprehensive synthesis has been lacking so far. 
In order to redress this shortcoming, an integrated perspective, supported by scholarly evidence, regarding basic 
characteristics of making sense of life and world is introduced. As a result four paradigmatic or root intellectual orientations 
(designated as type I, type II, type III and type IV) have been identified. The theory was found to be applicable across a wide 
range of thinkers, scholarly disciplines, and cultures. In the current paper (Part I) the framework is presented in terms of its 
main components and dynamics. Against this background the history of the science-religion interrelationship (hereafter also 
referred to as S-R) is briefly reviewed. Separate papers deal with objectivist tendencies (Part II), and with subjectivist 
manifestations in the S-R field (Part III).  
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1. Introduction 
 
The meta-theory to be utilized here was developed in detail in a first volume (Pietersen, 2011) and continued with new 
applications in a second volume,(Pietersen, 2014) and will therefore only briefly be discussed. 
A fundamental theoretical approach was developed that brought together in a coordinated manner, implicit 
intellectual premises or world views that constantly re-surface in human thought. Although these elements have long 
been part of the scholarly activity of humankind, a comprehensive synthesis has been lacking. The present series of 
papers show that the theory can also be applied to the field of science and religion.  
 
1.1 Archetypal orientations of the mind 
 
Figure 1 shows four orientations in human thought that are the result of a combination of two axes (epistemological and 
ontological), namely: objectivist-empyrean (type I); objectivist-empiricist (type II); subjectivist-empiricist (type III), and the 
subjectivist-empyrean (type IV).  
This is followed in Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5 by a description of characteristic elements of each of the four archetypes. 
These should be more or less self-explanatory, but it may be helpful to point out that each of the primary orientations 
address a different and basic question, namely: (a) what is this? (Type II); (b) what is behind this? (Type I); (c) what is 
wrong / wonderful about this? what is the story? (Type III); (d) what should be done about this? (Type IV). 
 
Figure 1: The four orientations in human thought 
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Figure 2: Objectivist-empyrean (type I) elements 
 
 Emphasize reason (rationality)
 Impersonal 
 Theoretical/integrative 
 Macroscopic focus 
 Comprehensive understanding 
 Concerned with possible ideas 
 To penetrate the deepest essentials and mysteries of life/world. 
 
Figure 3: Objectivist-empiricist (type II) elements 
 
 Emphasize reason (rationality)
 Impersonal 
 Systematic-analytic 
 Microscopic focus 
 Detailed explanation 
 Concerned with verifiable ideas 
 To systematically analyze, order, predict and control life/world  
 
Figure 4: Subjectivist-empiricist (type III) elements 
 
 Emphasize values (humanism)
 Personal-engaged 
 Experiential 
 Poetic-particular-critical 
 ‘Feeling with’ (solidarity) 
 Concerned with individuals (the particularized other) 
 To praise, eulogize, tell inspiring stories or To unmask, debunk, criticize and tell ‘sad’ stories 
 
Figure 5: Subjectivist-empyrean (type IV) elements 
 
 Emphasize values (humanism) 
 Communal-engaged 
 Conceptual 
 Ideological-universal-reformist 
 ‘Feeling for’ (development, becoming) 
 Concerned with society (the generalized other) 
 To change, renew and re-engineer life / world / society according to valued ideals 
 
1.1.1 The main principles  
 
The main propositions or theses of the meta-theory are as follows (Pietersen, 2011): 
Fundamental orientations of mind predetermine the type of ideas, theories, “ways” of making sense of and dealing 
with the world.  
a) Each orientation or modality of mind co-exists with other modes in a dynamic mutuality of conflict and 
complementariness.  
b) Thought products (individually or collectively) reflect different mixes of the basic orientations, although 
dominant (primary) tendencies prevail as a result of root “preferences”. No thinker functions entirely within a 
single (primary) mode of thought, but also in varying degrees interfaces with directly adjacent (secondary) 
modes. Tertiary orientations also manifest in each intellectual product, either in a conflicting, suppressed or 
underrepresented manner. 
c) Together, the different modes of thought form a unity or whole with each giving meaning to the other and with 
each dependent on the existence of its opposite mode. 
d) Attempted dominance by one modality of mind inevitably leads to countervailing reactions in other realms of 
thought. Adherents of highly divergent (directly opposing) orientations will more likely experience mutual 
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misunderstanding, disaffection and even potentially irreconcilable beliefs and convictions.  
e) Knowledge endeavours in the world at large, in different cultures, disciplines and traditions of thought, and at 
different levels of analysis, show similarity in terms of underlying modalities of mind.  
f) The limitations of one modality of mind are complemented by the strengths of others, especially its diagonally 
opposite mode. 
 
1.2 Some exemplars in the history of thought 
 
In this section a number of representatives of each of the main intellectual types in human thought, in this case in ancient 
Greek philosophy, Christian theology, modern Western philosophy and, lastly, modern philosophy of science, are 
introduced (see Pietersen, 2011; Pietersen, 2014). The main reason for doing this is to show the wide-ranging 
applicability of the meta-theory, in terms of work already carried out in analyzing other areas of scholarship.  
 
1.2.1 Type I: Plato, Gabirol, Augustine, Descartes and Popper 
 
(a) Plato: In Western thought, Plato figures as probably the most prominent and prototypical example of an objectivist-
empyrean thinker. This Greek philosopher produced the first all-round theory of knowing and being, which, inter alia, is 
presented in his parables of the Divided Line, the Sun and the Cave. Plato undoubtedly had the kind of mind that 
attempted to achieve the broadest, most encompassing explanation of truth and reality.  
Such is his still continuing intellectual legacy, that in the modern era, Alfred North Whitehead declared all of 
Western philosophy to be a mere footnote to Plato. Inspired by the truths of mathematics, for Plato the best thought was 
free from sense experience; from the variable, fluctuating nature of the physical world and its phenomena, in an 
unrelenting search for the One, the true source of "real" knowledge, namely, the Form of Forms.  
(b) Gabirol: Ibn Gabirol’s Fons Vitae (Fountain of Life) is a good example of Neo-Platonism in Mediaeval Jewish 
thought. It is a speculative work (in which he refers to only one other author, Plato) that addresses the root of wisdom, 
which he elaborates through a series of steps: from knowledge of matter and form, through knowledge of the will, to the 
science of the First Essence. 
Everything outside of the creator (the First Essence) consists of varying combinations of matter and form (the 
‘universal substance’), with simple (pure) substance being superior to compound substance, in a descending series down 
to the (least pure) corporeal things of experience. 
(c) Augustine: Though he was a theologian (perhaps the greatest in the history of post – Apostolic Christianity) and 
not a philosopher as such, Augustine (Bishop of Hippo) was a keen admirer of Plato and made frequent reference to him 
in especially his City of God.  
Augustine’s thought is wide-ranging. As Platonic thinker he acknowledges the importance of and uses rational 
argument in his theology. Likewise, his central concern is with the One, the Immutable source of everything – based on 
the need for the kind of certainty that a deep inner knowledge and experience of God and the Soul provides. 
(d) Descartes: Descartes’ cogito ergo sum philosophy focuses on an empyrean world of innate, self-evident ideas. 
Though he distrusted the senses throughout his work, he does provide for the corporeal world of things (res extensa). 
This is to be logically explained following the rules of mathematics (for him the only true example of certain human 
knowledge), and rejecting any belief based merely on ‘custom and example.’ 
(e) Popper: Karl Popper's theory of science is rooted in a purist (empyrean) approach to knowledge. He proposes a 
logical, deductive structure for the sciences as the only certain way to achieve truth. His system is based on the idea that 
all scientific theories are flawed, and that there is no external criterion of truth. He therefore promotes the ideal of aiming 
(through his principle of ‘falsification’) to achieve the best possible, unflawed, scientific theory of phenomena of interest to 
the scientist.  
His foundational orientation is manifested in his support for objective knowledge provided by his ‘logical theory of 
truth’; an approach of ‘truth by approximation’ that deliberately attempts to search for weaknesses in scientific theories 
through consistent application of the falsification principle. Experience or observation, although important for providing the 
empirical component of scientific truth, should never be the arbiter of truth. For Popper, the methodological purist (meta-
type I) and Kantian philosopher, all truth is theory-laden. 
 
1.2.2 Type II: Aristotle, Maimonides, Aquinas, Hume and Lakatos 
 
(a) Aristotle: Aristotle may be regarded as the first ‘scientific’ philosopher among the ancient Greeks. Contrary to Plato 
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(his teacher), Aristotle’s works are characterized by a systematic classification of the objects and phenomena of nature.  
Aristotle’s empiricist orientation, and emphasis on the truth provided by the senses, is a predominant feature of his 
work. His desire was to provide the concepts and cognitive apparatus to achieve precise, empirically supported 
knowledge in the microscopic style characteristic of modern science. His emphasis on empirical experience and his 
delight in the senses, especially of sight, is, for instance, prominent in the Metaphysics. For Aristotle experience is as 
important as theory, and in no way inferior to the latter. 
(b) Maimonides: This thinker, still regarded as the pre-eminent Jewish philosopher, is of the view that one should 
only believe what can be grasped with the intellect or perceived by the senses. His Guide of the Perplexed is aimed at 
educated Jews who are religious believers with a good background in the sciences (physics, mathematics), but who 
experience conflict between their faith and the principles of reason. Moses Maimonides is the archetypal Aristotelian who 
preceded his Christian counterpart, Thomas Aquinas, by almost a century. 
(c) Aquinas: Thomas Aquinas is the great systematic (Aristotelian), theologian of Christianity. His main stance was 
that human knowledge must start with the ‘effects’ of God, namely the ‘finite world’ and strive to reach God in this way.  
Using Aristotle’s concepts of substance, form, matter, act and potency, Aquinas developed a multi-tiered, causal, 
system that defines God as the first cause. His empiricist epistemology holds that knowledge of God must begin with 
sense experience and attain to God through rational thought, hence his well-known two-tier structure of nature and grace. 
(d) Hume: David Hume, who is generally regarded as the leading philosopher of (British) Empiricism, is known for 
his disavowal of metaphysics (type I) and especially the Cartesian philosophy of disembodied, ‘innate ideas.’  
For Hume, the essence of the mind is unknown, and its powers can only be determined by way of careful 
observation and experiment, such as in the natural sciences. He emphasizes the view that one cannot go beyond 
experience, even in attempts to formulate universal principles.  
(e) Lakatos: Imre Lakatos proposes an approach to scientific knowledge, which he calls 'research programs.' A 
research program consists of a hard core of main hypotheses (conjectures) and a flexible outer belt of secondary 
hypotheses and propositions that are more likely to change and be modified over time in scientific investigations.  
In contrast to Popper's focus on logical purity, a research program contains sets of hypotheses that are to be 
assessed by their ability to predict new scientific observations. Lakatos prefers an objectivist-empiricist scheme of 
scientific research, following a realist conception of truth.  
 
1.2.3 Type III: Protagoras, Halevi, Luther, Nietzsche and Kuhn 
 
(a) Protagoras: Protagoras’ thought is an early and distinctive example of the narrative-interpretive approach to truth. 
Contrary to the more impersonal, objectivist, philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, Protagoras’ thought is the prototypical 
example of a pragmatic epistemology combined with an optimistic humanism, with his now famous credo of “Man is the 
measure of all things.”  
He was not a systematic thinker attempting to build a theoretical foundation, which is typical of type I and II realms 
of thought, but a nominalist who viewed human conduct as based only on experience. 
(b) Halevi: Halevi’s Kitab al Khazari is essentially a defence as well as praise of the Jewish religion and way of life, 
in the narrative-poetic (type III) modality of mind.  
Although he accepted the importance of reason, overall, Judah Halevi had a negative attitude toward philosophy 
because it reduces God to an impersonal force. This approach has much in common with the Islamic thinker, Al-Ghazali, 
from whom he derived his inspiration. 
(c) Luther: In contrast to the objectivist nature of the thought of Augustine and Aquinas, Martin Luther emphasizes 
the personal, I – Thou, relationship with God, in the subjectivist-empiricist orientation of mind. It is a relationship based on 
faith, not on scholastic reasoning. 
Luther wanted everything as non-rational, non-legal as possible (contra types I and II), and even as a young man 
preferred the more personal (type III) approach to theology, rather than a grand, objectivist intellectual structure, typical of 
scholasticism (reaching back to Aquinas, and even further, to Aristotle). 
(d) Nietzsche: Friedrich Nietzsche is the proponent of a philosophy of ‘self-overcoming’ and of the ‘trans-valuation 
of all values.’ He is widely recognized as the modern intellectual debunker (type III mode) par excellence. Nietzsche 
relentlessly attacks all objectivist-empyrean (metaphysical) thought; thus, any ‘system’ or edifice of ideas, especially 
those pretending to be the final word.  
His thought is essentially two-fold. It consists, firstly, of repeated and devastating critiques of objectivist thought 
with its pretence of attaining a purified, static, truth, and, secondly, of a passionate promotion and celebration of life as 
the Will to Power.  
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(e) Kuhn: Kuhn is the critical, unmasking philosopher of science, in the subjectivist-empiricist tradition. What Kuhn 
mainly intended doing, was to overturn the typical, naïve, account of science as a fully rational and logical undertaking 
that unfolds in a cumulative and linear way.  
His historicist account of the growth of scientific knowledge is opposed to the impersonal, objectivist account of 
Popper (the type I, metaphysical philosopher of science). He favors an interpretive approach, admitting the importance in 
his thought of the sociology and social psychology of scientists. 
 
1.2.4 Type IV: Plato, Pakuda, Calvin, Marx and Feyerabend 
 
(a) Plato: Plato’s aim was to provide a theory of society according to which the Greek city-state could be transformed and 
turned into a perfect community; a state (polis) where the good of the whole could be achieved according to a strict 
demarcation of the roles and duties of each class of citizens.  
From Plato’s account of the ideal (best) society his engagement in the subjectivist-empyrean (type IV) mode of 
thought, as well as in political praxis (acting as political consultant to king Dion of Syracuse), is clearly evident. In his 
Seventh Letter he even expresses his desire to be more than a man ‘of mere words.’ 
(b) Pakuda: Ibn Pakuda is the author of the first treatise on ethics in Judaism, entitled Duties of the Heart. Together 
with Guide of the Perplexed (Maimonides) and Khuzari (Halevi), it became one of the most celebrated works in Judaism.  
The work presents a detailed exposition of a range of different ethical imperatives, according to which the Jewish 
faithful should think and act. Pakuda distinguishes between ‘duties of the limb (mere lip service), and ‘duties of the heart.’ 
His explicit aim was to promote the latter as being the true wisdom and faith for living the religious life.  
(c) Calvin: Jean Calvin was the influential reformer and organizer of Protestantism. Known among Roman 
Catholics as the ‘Pope of Geneva’, and among admiring colleagues as the ‘Theologian’ his type IV orientation is strongly 
evident in his work and deeds. His aim was to promote God’s majesty, power and kingdom on earth. In the process he 
also compares himself to the biblical ruler, King David.  
(d) Marx: Karl Marx desired to transform the world in a revolutionary manner, into a classless society. His ideology 
of Communism had wide impact and serves as a major example of the subjectivist-empyrean orientation in modern 
thought.  
The Communist Manifesto contains Marx’s ideas for bringing about a social revolution in which the proletariat (the 
poor, working class) are to overthrow and replace the bourgeoisie (capitalists and property-owners). In true subjectivist-
empyrean (type IV) mode, for Marx it was more important to change history than understanding it.  
(e) Feyerabend: Paul Feyerabend is the subjectivist-empiricist (type III) critic of conventional (Popperian) 
philosophy of science. Later on, especially with his Science in a Free Society, he adopted a strong ideological (type IV) 
approach. His aim was to promote a removal of the scientists from their central position of influence in society.  
 
2. Science and Religion in Historical Perspective 
 
This section approaches the field of science-and-religion (hereafter also referred to as: S-R) from a broad historical point 
of view. It attempts to show that the often closely intertwined scientific, religious and philosophical character of its 
discourse is anchored in the continuing interplay of basic and age-old modalities of human thought. (Pietersen, 2011; 
Pietersen, 2014).  
The endeavours of science and of religion are central to human life. Although reason (manifested in the 
achievements of modern science) and revelation, or faith, has, since the Enlightenment, increasingly become separated, 
their fundamental co-existence as ineradicable dimensions of human nature and of culture continues.  
Classical Greek thought (Jaeger, 1947) presents a striking example of the ebb and flow of these basic powers of 
the mind; of the close and dynamic interconnectedness of archetypal orientations. These may, in one sense, be 
described as the Impersonal (reflected in the search for abstract principles and laws of science and of metaphysics) and 
the Personal (reflected in narratives of divinities and gods in the world).  
They operate in pre-Socratic thought, for instance, through varying combinations and sequences of philosophy and 
theology; of objectivist and subjectivist mixes in the early Greek mind. But, passim Kant, like oil and water they never 
really mix (Kant, 1960/1794: 12). Poetry (and religious prose) may have its metaphysical moments; metaphysics may be 
rendered in poetical or quasi-poetical prose (e.g., Plato’s dialogues), but poetry is not metaphysics, and vice versa. 
Similarly (and in conformity with the meta-theoretical stance of the present work and its predecessors), science is not 
religion (though, for some, it may become so, or treated as such); religion is not science (though many theologians - such 
as Aquinas and Harnack – have attempted to explain its beliefs and doctrines from the perspective of the scientific 
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modality of mind). The fact is that these domains speak different languages; reflect different realms of experience and 
understanding, and account in different ways for the world that we live in and of which we are part.  
Attempts to amalgamate or go beyond these modalities of knowing and being do not succeed. Such, for example, 
may be observed about the, otherwise stimulating, ideas of Jan Smuts and Teilhard de Chardin (see further on). In these 
cases the waters are muddied, by either describing the personal in terms of the impersonal, or the impersonal in terms of 
the personal, and so (in the present author’s view) end up as examples of question-begging intellectual ‘splicing.’ 
Thus, the bifurcation of the impersonal and the personal (as well as of empirical and empyrean modalities) is at the 
root of ancient as well as modern attempts to reconcile faith and reason, religion and science. In a fundamental sense 
they should be viewed as inseparable, yet separate modes of being and activity – each of which provides meaning to our 
existence (see Figure 6 below). In the religious sphere this is well-expressed by John Paul II in the opening lines of his 
encyclical, Fides et Ratio (1998): “Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the 
contemplation of truth.” (John Paul II, 1998). 
 
Figure 6: Basic modalities of mind 
 
 Impersonal Personal
Worldly Science (type II) Poetry (type III)
Other-Worldly Metaphysics(type I) Religion (type IV)
 
2.1 A brief historical review 
 
As far as the topic of the relationship between science and religion is concerned, one may conveniently start with its early 
manifestation in the thought of the ancient (pre-Socratic) Greeks.  
The first point to note is that, contrary to the Jewish (and later on also Christian) religion, the divinities of the 
ancient Greeks were part of and operated inside the world of nature (partly also a recurring theme through panentheistic 
and process theological tendencies in the modern S-R literature). In contrast to the Hebrew belief in the world as the free 
creation of God (the Logos) who: “… is stationed outside the world and brings that world into existence by his own 
personal fiat [the] Greek gods are stationed inside the world; they are descended from Heaven and Earth, the two 
greatest and most exalted parts of the universe; and they are generated by the mighty power of Eros, who likewise 
belongs within the world as an all-engendering primitive force.” (Jaeger, 1947: 16).  
In the ancient Greek mind the intellectual and religious dimensions of life (reflecting both objectivist and subjectivist 
modalities in the present context) were, in varying degrees, enmeshed in a way that, contrary to the modern worldview, 
cannot easily be separated. Jaeger observes: “Taking the natural world as their starting-point, they develop the idea of 
some highest principle …and then proceed to assert of it that 'this must be the Divine'.” (Jaeger, 1947: 31). This 
represents a shift from the arche (rule) of the Divine; i.e., the principle (idea; force) of the Divine Hesiodic family of gods 
that rule everything on earth, to the divinity of the ruling rational Principle, namely, the divine Principle of the first 
philosophers. But note that philosophy and religion (or S-R in its modern context) is still closely held together in the minds 
of the early Greek thinkers. 
It is interesting to observe the existence of pendulum-swings between the rational and religious content of ancient 
Greek thought. Meta-theoretically, it must be stated that this also highlights the problem of mixing the personal (namely, 
mythical Greek divinities) with the first attempts of philosophy to achieve a rational (impersonal) understanding of nature. 
Following the renowned German classicist, Werner Jaeger (1947), this recurring phenomenon in pre-Socratic thought 
may briefly be sketched, as follows: 
¾ In the cosmogony of Hesiod, who saw the divine everywhere in the physical elements and forces of nature, an 
underlying desire to develop a rational (objectivist) scheme of the origins of the gods can be detected: “…a 
type of causal thinking unmistakably rational in the consistency with which it is carried out, even though it 
takes the form of myth” (Jaeger, 1947: 12); 
¾ Thales is known for his assertion that ‘everything is full of gods,’ meaning: “…everything is full of mysterious 
living forces; the distinction between animate and inanimate nature has no foundation in fact; everything has a 
soul” (Jaeger, 1947: 21);  
¾ Parmenides’ philosophy of one reality and truth that admits no change, an important influence on Plato, is 
presented in the form of a poem, in which: “…he seeks to proclaim the 'truth' (aletheia) which he has learned 
from the mouth of the goddess herself, and the whole body of his poem professes to be her direct address to 
him” (Jaeger, 1947: 94);  
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¾ Heraclitus, in turn, is known for his philosophy of perpetual flux and change, which he relates to a divine 
cosmic law operating in the world: “…This one thing that keeps asserting itself in struggle and in change is 
what Heraclitus calls God” (Jaeger, 1947: 119);  
¾ The Ionian philosophy of nature of Empedocles (regarded as an early progenitor of natural science) is similarly 
presented in terms of mythical religious figures, referring to: “…the four principles or roots of all things as gods, 
and names them Zeus, Hera, Aidoneus, and Nestis” (Jaeger, 1947: 137);  
¾ Anaxagoras, for whom the sun was a mere ‘glowing stone,’ tries to find a place for mind in his physical theory 
of the world and argues that, because mind is not a diverse mix of elements such as the physical world 
consists of, it must be the divine in us: “…the Divine is Pure reason.” (Jaeger, 1947: 164).  
Next, some notable figures in later periods of history may be considered for their relevance to the S-R field. Roger 
Bacon, a contemporary of Thomas Aquinas, was convinced that the best source of certain knowledge is sense-
experience; knowledge which is to be gained through experimenting with the objects and phenomena of nature. Thus, the 
mind becomes satisfied that a fire burns, not by propositional reasoning or argument, but by actually putting one’s hand 
or some ‘combustible thing’ into it. (Bacon, 1268: 371).  
Four hundred and seventy one years later David Hume echoes this Ionian sentiment, by stating that we cannot 
form any idea or concept of what the taste of a pineapple is, until we have actually tasted one (Pietersen, 2011: 111). 
However, the difference is that for Hume sense-perception was the only reliable source or basis of truth and of knowledge 
of the world, whilst Roger Bacon, following the Scholastics, acknowledged the truth of argument or reason, as well as the 
authority of the Church. Given the times that he lived in, Bacon also included the religious dimension of divine inspiration. 
Yet, he clearly preferred the certitude of experience provided by experiment – the kind of knowledge that ‘calms the 
mind.’  
A name that frequently appears in the S-R literature is, of course, that of Galileo Galilei (1564 – 1641). Never 
doubting the primacy of the church and of faith, he famously observed that ‘religion teaches us how to go to heaven; 
science teaches us how the heaven goes.’ His downfall and well-known recantation of his scientific theories which were 
based on almost unimpeachable empirical measurements and mathematical analysis is, as the historical record shows, 
largely the result of his own personality and of the intrigues of certain Aristotelian academics and an ambitious priest 
Drake, 1980: 61), and not of a clash between science and religion as such. In short, in Galileo’s time: “…science had 
been the handmaiden of philosophy, which in turn was the handmaiden of theology. He wished to free science from 
subservience to philosophy as the historical obstacle to its utility and progress.” (Drake, 1980: 90). 
For Immanuel Kant (1794) reason (science) and religion must be separated so that: “…the pure religion of reason 
will rule overall, ‘so that God may be all in all.’” (Kant, 1960/1794: 112). Thus, it would seem that Kant leaves the door 
open for supernatural intervention, yet, on the other hand, views religion as being embedded in experience and history 
and therefore not inside the trustworthy circle of pure reason, so to speak. In the end, for Kant, outside of rational thought 
about religion in terms of the fundamental moral law (existing objectively as a universal, immutable, super-sensible 
principle) and the moral disposition (existing and operating within the human as a subjective, inner, basic moral 
orientation that is conditioned by the Moral Law), there is no room for a faith based on dogma or opinion. Hence, also, no 
compelling reasons for giving primacy to beliefs based on Church doctrine, enforced by ecclesiastical authority. 
In the mid-nineteenth century, with the rising influence of science, and of its establishment as a profession (the 
designation ‘scientist’ first came into use at this time), the two spheres became increasingly estranged from one another. 
The names of Draper and White are oft-quoted examples of thinkers using terms such as ‘antagonism,’ ‘conflict,’ (Draper, 
1881: viii) and ‘warfare,’ (White, 1895) to depict the relationship between science and religion. 
Draper characterizes this antagonism as a: “…continuation of a struggle that commenced when Christianity began 
to attain political power…” (Draper, 1881: vii). He also states that he did not include so-called ‘moderate’ religions in his 
attack: “…it is not with the moderates but with the extremists that the impartial reader is mainly concerned.” (Draper, 
1881: xii). Further-on he sings the praises of science, and expresses the view that: “She has never attempted to throw 
odium or inflict social ruin on any human being.” (Draper, 1881: xii). In reaction to this nineteenth century pro-science 
sentiment, the question for the present-day (post WW II) reader inevitably arises: but what answer, other than mea culpa, 
can science give to humanity after Hiroshima and Nagasaki? 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the historian, Andrew Dickenson White produced his History of the warfare of 
science with theology in Christendom (White, 1895). In the North American context this work set the tone for much of the 
S-R debate during the first half of the twentieth century. In a public address he expounded the thesis that: “In all modern 
history, interference with science in the supposed interest of religion, no matter how conscientious such interference may 
have been, has resulted in the direst evils both to religion and science, and invariably; and, on the other hand, all 
untrammelled scientific investigation, no matter how dangerous to religion some of its stages may have seemed for the 
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time to be, has invariably resulted in the highest good both of religion and science.” (White, 1895: 3).  
We now turn to Teilhard de Chardin, Jan Smuts and Alfred North Whitehead, the first two being clear examples, in 
the present context, of stimulating but eventually unsuccessful attempts to resolve the impersonal-personal antimony in 
human thought.  
For Teilhard de Chardin the pinnacle of a complex process of evolution is what he describes as the ‘Omega-point.’ 
In terms of its meta-theoretical significance, de Chardin’s thought is confusing. He firstly expresses the view that: “…at 
the world's Omega, as at its Alpha, lies the Impersonal,” (de Chardin, 1959: 258), which is then followed further-on with 
the statement that: “The Future-Universal could not be anything else but the Hyper-Personal - at the Omega Point.” (de 
Chardin, 1959: 260). His view of the S-R relationship is that the conflict must be resolved by way of a synthesis: “…when 
we turn towards the summit, towards the totality and the future, we cannot help engaging in religion. Religion and science 
are the two conjugated faces or phases of one and the same complete act of knowledge…” (de Chardin, 1959: 285). For 
the celebrated historian of philosophy, Frederick Copleston, de Chardin’s thought in the end turns out to be: “…vague 
impressions and concepts which are not clearly defined. The whole thing, it may be said, is a mixture of science, poetry 
and religious faith.” (Copleston, 1974: 326). 
During the early decades of the twentieth century, the South African statesman and scientist-philosopher, Jan 
Smuts (who coined the term ‘holism’) engaged in a venture similar to but independently of Teilhard de Chardin. Unlike the 
latter, Smuts, however, does not include religion or theology in his own grand metaphysical vision and synthesis of the 
process of evolution, though it is similarly utopian in its main thrust.  
For Smuts: “Evolution is nothing but the gradual development and stratification of progressive series of wholes, 
stretching from the inorganic beginnings to the highest levels of spiritual creation.” (Smuts, 1987/1926: v). This is the 
principle of ‘holism,’ a process of ‘creative synthesis,’ a ‘universe of whole-making.’ (Smuts, 1987/1926: 87).  
Again one finds the unfortunate mix of the impersonal and personal dimensions or modalities of mind. By way of 
example, he states that: “Finally, there emerge the ideal wholes, or Holistic Ideals, or Absolute Values, disengaged and 
set free from human personality, operating as creative factors on their own account in the upbuilding of a spiritual world. 
Such are the Ideals of Truth, Beauty and Goodness, which lay the foundations of a new order in the universe.” (Smuts, 
1987/1926: 107).  
Towards the end of his book, however, he reaches the conclusion that: “Personality is the supreme embodiment of 
Holism both in its individual and its universal tendencies.” (Smuts, 1987/1926: 263). Further-on he continues in quasi-
poetic, almost mystical, fashion with: “Wholeness as free and harmonious self-realization thus sums up the summum 
bonum of Holism,” (Smuts, 1987/1926: 292), and: “Holism, not Spiritualism, is the key to the interpretation of the universe. 
Mind is not at the beginning but at the end, but Holism is everywhere and all in all.” (Smuts, 1987/1926: 335). 59  
Finally, he concludes with: “The groaning and travailing of the universe is never aimless or resultless. Its profound 
labours mean new creation, the slow, painful birth of wholes, of new and higher wholes, and the slow but steady 
realization of the Good…” (Smuts, 1987/1926: 344). 
Here, it must be observed, Smuts smuggles in teleology through the back door. And the struggle between the 
personal (Smuts’ ‘poetic’ moments; the value he attaches in his scheme, to ‘Personality’) and the impersonal (an 
irresistible ‘Force’, Principle or Process) dimensions of our thinking surfaces again. Rephrasing Copleston, one may 
remark of Smuts’ system that: ‘the whole thing is a mixture of Darwinian science and metaphysics, tinged with poetical 
mysticism.’  
In his Religion in the Making, Whitehead argues for a non-personal, metaphysically defensible, religion. In this 
system God becomes an ‘actual entity’, the: “...supreme God of rationalized religion.” (Whitehead, 1926: 26). But even 
Whitehead cannot avoid taking note of the dichotomy, namely, of God as the ‘impersonal order of the universe’, and of 
God as the ‘one person creating the universe.’ (Whitehead, 1926: 35).  
Another figure often mentioned in the S-R literature, is Albert Einstein, with his now widely (if not exhaustingly) 
quoted: “…science without religion is lame, religion without science is blind.” Einstein, 1982/1954: 46). Einstein, the 
pantheist, took an essentially Humean position, separating science (the ‘is’) from religion (the ‘ought’). As far as he was 
concerned, the idea of a personal God is at the root of the conflict between science and religion, and should be 
dispensed with. He went on to urge ‘teachers of religion’: “…to have the stature to give up the doctrine of a personal 
God.” Einstein, 1982/1954: 48). 
Coming from another direction, the philosopher Mary Midgley (1992) is concerned about what she perceives to be 
a modern trend to regard science as the source of salvation, with scant regard for humankind’s spiritual needs (Midgley, 
1992: 2). To the idea that science and religion is in conflict, her pointed response is that it: “...is an extremely odd idea, 
since it has to mean that they have somewhere been competing for the same job…” (Midgley, 1992: 51). She asks the 
question, which she suggests be taken seriously by the S-R scholarly community, whether science: “…is in the business 
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of providing the faith by which people live. Is it actually in that business?” (Midgley, 1992: 58). She also puts her finger on 
an important motive of many, especially leading, S-R participants, namely: the “hunger for a unifying pattern,” (Midgley, 
1995: 22), the urge to bring science and religion under one roof. 
For Brooke, (1991: 33) the view that the science and religion relationship is one of conflict is narrow and 
inappropriate. The history of science shows a much more complex picture, such as, for example in the case of Isaac 
Newton who also ascribed the operation of the law of gravitation to God. Both Robert Boyle, the chemist, and Albert 
Einstein applies religious imagery: nature as temple and the scientist as priest by Boyle (Brooke, 1991: 18); while Einstein 
speaks of the ‘temple of science.’ (Einstein, 1982/1954: 224).  
For many scientists (at least in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries), the laws of nature reflects the order in 
the universe created by God. In the philosophy of law this was, for example, also a basic premise in The Institutes of 
Justinian (535 CE) and, twelve centuries later (in 1758), by William Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of 
England. (Pietersen, 2011: 220).  
Brooke (1991) unfortunately and mistakenly, refers to the burning of Michael Servetus (1511 – 1553) as an 
example that is reportedly used to portray conflict between religion and science. However, the historical record shows 
that Servetus suffered the auto-da-fe for his persistent attack on the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, something which 
greatly aggravated the leading Protestant reformer of the time, John Calvin. Briefly, in an earlier letter to a colleague 
Calvin openly stated that if Servetus ever set foot in Geneva, he (Calvin) would never allow him to leave alive. And so it 
turned out to be the case. It was therefore not a clash between science and religion. 
Brooke concludes with the surely more reasonable view that the conflict thesis is overdrawn. Science and religion: 
“…should rather be seen as complex social activities involving different expressions of human concern, the same 
individuals often participating in both.” (Brooke, 1991: 42). 
The next section provides a brief overview of a more recent approach to the science and religion relationship, here 
referred to as the Zygon movement. 
 
2.2 The Zygon movement 
 
The pioneering figure in the modern S-R discussion is Ralph Burhoe, a biologist, who strongly advocated the idea of 
bringing religion into line with the insights and truths of modern science. Hoping to replace the conventional, 
‘supernatural,’ religion, Burhoe enthuses about the possibility of: “…beginning to speak scientifically about both the 
human spirit and the Holy Spirit. A scientific spirituality is aborning!” (Burhoe, 2005: 808).  
In the mid-sixties a journal, ostensibly aiming to promote dialogue between science and religion, was established, 
and named Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science. Zygon means: “…the yoking or harnessing of a team which must 
effectively pull together…” (Editor, 2005: 247). This journal, which soon became a primary (but not only) outlet for 
scholarly publications in the S-R field, had as its main objective: “…the task of reformulating religion for an age of 
science, not simply analyzing scientifically or historically what has gone on thus far…” (Editor, 2005: 252).  
It should therefore be noted that the modern science-and-religion interface or discussion is essentially an ideology-
driven enterprise. It is, in the main, a North American reform movement (incentivized by the financial largesse of the 
Templeton Foundation), which aims to lay the groundwork for and help bring about a new (‘non-supernatural’) theology 
for ‘a scientific age’. The major scholarly figure in this endeavour is Ian Barbour, a physicist who also trained as a minister 
of religion, more about whom will be said in Part II. 
Given the aim of the present series of papers, only a brief sampler from the burgeoning S-R literature will be given 
in the following paragraphs, to indicate some of the diversity of issues and proposals that are put forward. With few 
exceptions, almost all contributors share the scientific worldview, and a conviction that the ‘way’ of science is the prime 
example to follow. The main group of S-R participants consists of scientists, philosophers and theologians (mostly the 
former two groups), and of those with a background in one or more of these disciplines (such as the leading S-R figures 
of Barbour, Polkinghorne, and Peacocke).  
One may observe that there is in much of the S-R writing a contradictory tendency (see Peters, 1996: 328, for 
instance). On the one hand, the palm is offered for friendly dialogue with religion, but at the same time it is also insisted 
that for religion/theology to be a worthy conversational partner, it should re-think and re-invent itself, so as to become a 
credible faith in an ‘age of science.’ In addition, only a few theologians have so far entered the S-R arena, to the dismay 
of many current members of this scholarly community, especially Arthur Peacocke.  
The prevailing and generally optimistic view among S-R participants is, as Ted Peters confidently phrases it, that: 
“Both scientists and theologians are engaged in a common search for shared understanding.” (Peters, 1996: 323). By 
contrast, there are also those who are less optimistic about the kind of integration of science and religion that many in the 
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S-R community aim (or rather hope) for. As one author rather pessimistically concludes: “…while we may no longer have 
two totally separate realms of discourse, we also have little likelihood of achieving a single integrated intellectual 
enterprise.” (Mooney, 1991: 36).  
Some of the more unconventional proposals that appear in Zygon are as follows: 
• Discussion of how an artificial intelligence project, namely: ‘Cog, a humanoid robot’ can be enriched by 
theology (Foerst, 1998: 91);  
• A complexity theory-based approach called ‘chaos theology’ (Bonting, 1999: 323);  
• Based on the phenomenon of ecstatic feelings that often accompanies epileptic seizures, it is concluded that 
the human brain is a ‘God module’ (Albright, 2000: 735);  
• Discussion of the neurological roots of religious experience, in which Abraham, Moses, Muhammad and Jesus 
Christ, are portrayed as examples of ‘limbic system hyperactivity.’ (Joseph, 2001: 105). 
In view of the above (and of other concerns in the field) it should perhaps not come as a surprise that a former 
Templeton prize-winner, the philosopher Michael Ruse (2007), became wholly disillusioned with the field. In a paper in 
Zygon, he expresses the following criticisms: 
¾ “Article after article, book after book, seems to me to hover between the trivial and the inane” (Ruse, 2007: 
579);  
¾ “Fundamental questions about the nature of existence, about God, about the human being (the soul, for 
instance), about morality, get thin discussions...too often spin wheels, epicycles on epicycles.” (Ruse, 2007: 
580); 
¾ “Too many people in the science-religion field are simply not properly trained. You cannot write on these 
things without some real understanding of philosophy and theology.” (Ruse, 2007: 580);  
¾ “There is an enthusiasm in the field these days for the notion of emergence...it seems all too clear that by 
uncritically embracing emergence people are trying on the cheap or on the sly to get spirituality or some such 
thing out of material things. It can’t be done…” (Ruse, 2007: 581).  
This section concludes with a summary of agreements and differences (Barbour, 2010: 247 – 264) between 
leading S-R thinkers, shown in Figures 7 and 8.  
 
Figure 7: Agreement between leading S-R thinkers 
 
Barbour (1) critical realism; 
(2) holism, emergence, and levels of organization; 
(3) human nature (namely: bio-cultural evolution); and 
(4) limitations in God’s power 
Peacocke
Polkinghorne 
 
Figure 8: Disagreements between leading S-R thinkers 
 
Theme Barbour Peacocke Polkinghorne 
Conceptions of God: Dipolar theism(God’s necessary self-limitation) 
Panentheism
(God’s voluntary self-limitation) 
Trinitarian theism 
(God’s voluntary self-limitation) 
Laws of nature are: Temporary habits of nature Immanent in nature Ordained by God 
Divine action is: Two-way interaction Whole-part constraint Information input 
Christ is: A man responsive to God’s call A new emergent The incarnate Son 
 
2.3 Summary 
 
This paper introduced a fundamental theoretical framework that accounts for axiomatic intellectual distinctions in human 
thought. This was followed by a survey of the S-R literature indicating that reason and faith, science and religion are not 
necessarily in conflict. The relationship between the two spheres of human existence is much more complex and 
intertwined, as should, for example, be evident from pre-Socratic Greek thought.  
A burgeoning literature, that in various ways seek consonance or even integration of science and religion, has 
been generated over the past few decades. Most of the S-R writing are science-oriented and usually takes the view that 
religion/theology has to be ‘re-written,’ to be more suitable to a scientific age. Supernaturalism is not accepted by most S-
R participants today. 
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